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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This paper draws on secondary data to map out a proliferating set of international nutrition 
commitment initiatives, and assesses how these employ accountability mechanisms to support the 
delivery of financial and other commitments.  
 
These accountability mechanisms are assessed for aspects of answerability, as well as enforcement 
(cf Schedler 1999). Answerability entails on the one hand, the right of the party that holds account to 
receive appropriate information from the accountable party on what is/will be done to achieve the 
nutrition inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts towards which commitments have been made. On the 
other hand, accountable actors have an obligation to justify and clarify through public dialogue the 
choices of particular instruments, programmes and actions that seek to advance nutrition. The analysis 
of enforcement considers that accounting actors do not just critically challenge accountable persons but 
are able to reward good performance as well as impose negative sanctions in case of improper behavior.  
 
The paper finds an expanding patchwork of international nutrition commitment initiatives having 
idiosyncratic and often underdeveloped accountability arrangements lacking clarity on who holds 
whom to account for what, by when, how and in accordance to what rules and norms. In general, 
aspects of answerability are better developed than aspects of enforcement.  
 
International nutrition commitment initiatives are no longer the preserve of national governments and 
multilateral organisations, as individual and collectives of civil society organisations as well as private 
sector actors increasingly sign up. This diversity of actors needs to be better reflected in diverse 
accountability arrangements, and substantial if ad hoc experimentation is taking place towards this end. 
Whereas this has been so far most successful in terms of new forms of dialogue and consultation, 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are trailing.  
 
Although common monitoring frameworks for setting out and reporting on commitments could be 
critical for achieving greater accountability, international summits somewhat narrowly focus attention 
on forging agreement on commitments. Afterwards, in many though not all cases, ad hoc and 
uncoordinated efforts are made at developing commitment monitoring mechanisms.  
 
Common frameworks for setting out and reporting on nutrition commitments could be critical for 
achieving greater accountability. Current nutrition commitment initiatives could thus as a priority 
develop such frameworks, drawing on international best practice and paying sufficient attention to the 
diverse needs of public, private and third sector actors that sign up to these. Such reviews should take 
active account of the distinct monitoring approaches that are currently fashioned, emphasising 
governments (EWEC), donors, governments and civil society (SUN) and self-reporting.  
 
Private sector companies have a critical role to play in food systems that make nutritious food 
accessible to the poor, and increasingly are signed up partners in international nutrition commitments 
such as the New Alliance. As yet, data on contributions of the private sector towards stated 
commitments, and processes steering its collection, are weakly developed. One key challenge here is to 
devise processes that can strike a meaningful balance between the interests of public accountability and 
private sector interests (e.g. commercial confidentiality).  
 
  
 
Similarly, individual and collectives of civil society organisations are to be held accountable for their 
performance. Encouragingly, some groups such as WorldVision and Interaction have already started to 
self-report on their performance vis-à-vis commitments. As much of this seems to be currently based on 
a trial and error approach, there are clear opportunities for learning within and across civil society and 
private sectors. More critical questions do however need to be asked about how self-monitoring can be 
done well, how it can be facilitated, as well as about the limits of self-monitoring (financial, practical or 
otherwise).  
 
Even the most advanced international nutrition commitment initiatives, such as the Every Woman 
Every Child campaign and the SUN Movement have as yet only weakly developed enforcement 
mechanisms; this diminishes overall accountability. This review found it hard to build up an accurate 
picture of the implicit or explicit rules that govern stakeholders’ delivery of commitments; the existence 
(leave be the application) of sanctions/rewards for (non)compliance; and the existence and effectiveness 
of possible mechanisms that enforce these.1 It is not clear if this is a matter of lack of demand and/or of 
design, and unclear under what political and economic conditions such logics of compliance might be 
developed. Arguably, where new nutrition commitments are made in future, a more explicit and upfront 
demand for clear rules of engagement and enforcement mechanisms may be made, for instance by civil 
society groups.  
 
Conceivably, the lack of clarity on rules of engagement and enforcement mechanisms is a reflection of 
the highly collaborative nature of international nutrition commitments. This nature makes it hard 
for logics of compliance to develop and are thus often ruled by logics of participation that 
incrementally build ownership, greater commitment, mutual responsibility and partnerships. Moreover, 
greater complexity in the number and types of actors involved in international nutrition commitment 
initiatives may drive such a logic of participation. Yet, as incremental approaches need time to develop 
mature accountability mechanisms, international nutrition commitment initiatives may have to move 
away from short 4-5 year terms towards longer term (10-15 year) commitment horizons.  
 
In all, the enforceability of international nutrition commitments should not be assumed as given. 
Indeed, delivery of nutrition commitments is significantly dependent on the goodwill of actors that 
make these commitments, and incentivised by social reputational effects (increased or lowered status) 
of adherence or breach of commitments.
                                               
1 A primary research based methodology could have better addressed these questions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last five years, nutrition has gained clear attention on the development agendas of national and 
international development partners, governments and political leaders. Prime Ministers from India 
(Manmohan Singh) and Great Britain (David Cameron) and Presidents from Malawi (Joyce Banda), 
Tanzania (Jakaya Kikwete) and Brazil (Dilma Rousseff) are amongst a growing group of political leaders 
that publicly speak out about the importance of enhancing child nutrition outcomes. Increasingly, public 
policies set numeric targets on enhanced nutrition outcomes to be achieved within clear timeframes, 
and financial commitments pledged towards the end. While such steps are extremely important for 
advancing national and international action on nutrition, what is less clear is how and to what extent 
development actors can be held accountable for delivering on these publicly expressed ambitions, 
pledges and commitments.  
 
This paper explores the role of accountability mechanisms for these kinds of commitments seeking to 
accelerate child undernutrition reduction, at global and national levels. It maps out the landscape of 
commitments made by (particularly) governments, multilateral bodies and (to a smaller extent) 
international civil society organisations and critically explores the way in which an emerging set of 
accountability mechanisms currently take shape around such nutrition commitments.  
 
The paper starts by setting out a brief conceptual discussion of key aspects of accountability, to provide 
a framework to guide the subsequent analysis of accountability for nutrition. The final section will offer 
suggestions on how these insights may support a strategic role for the Children’s Investment Fund 
Foundation (CIFF) in accountability processes for nutrition.  
1.1 Key aspects of accountability for nutrition 
  
While accountability is a somewhat fuzzy concept, spawning various theories and approaches, a useful 
definition is provided in an influential paper by Andreas Schedler: ‘A is accountable to B when A is 
obliged to inform B about A's (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer 
punishment in the case of eventual misconduct’ (1999: 17). Such a notion of political accountability 
involves two dimensions. Firstly, answerability: ‘the obligation of public officials to inform about and to 
explain what they are doing; and enforcement, the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions 
on powerholders who have violated their public duties’ (ibid: 14 italics ed.). Answerability involves a 
dialogic relationship between accountable and accounting actors. Thus, people have a right to receive 
(a) information and (b) an explanation, which involves a corresponding obligation on accountable actors 
to provide all necessary information and to justify one's conduct (ibid:17). The second dimension, 
enforcement, considers that accounting actors do not just critically challenge accountable persons but 
are able to reward good performance as well as impose negative sanctions to ’eventually punish’ them 
in case of improper behaviour (ibid: 15). This hence requires monitoring mechanisms that provide 
evidence on performance, and critically linked to these, enforcement mechanisms that incentivise 
actors to perform well.  Where linkages between monitoring and enforcement are weak, accountability 
is weakened. Accountability thus involves the prevention of abuse of power, assuring compliance with 
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procedures and standards, and improving performance and learning (Brinkerhoff 2004). Moreover, 
accountability needs to be exercised in public to be credible (Schedler 1999).  
 
Critically, accountability is not an absolute concept that can be simply assessed as either existent or 
non-existent. Rather, ‘evidence’, ‘ownership’ and ‘debate’ (Droop et al, 2008) or ‘information’, 
‘justification’, and ‘reward/punishment’ are continuous variables that exist in varying degrees, and in 
varying mixtures. Hence: ”Even if one or two of them are missing we may still legitimately speak of acts 
of accountability” (Schedler 1999: 17).  
 
What then does this mean in terms of accountability for public nutrition commitments? Firstly, it 
suggests that the purpose of accountability for nutrition is to enable individual citizens and citizen 
collectives, communities and actors within government to make those accountable answerable for the 
the appropriateness of substantive policies and policymaking processes2 towards, and the 
achievements of reduced burdens of undernutrition. It seeks to achieve this through four main 
processes: (a) information gathering and sharing; (b) explanation, justification and dialogue; (c) 
monitoring and (d) enforcement mechanisms (Table 1).3  
 
Table 1: Political accountability for nutrition: key aspects 
Answerability Enforcement 
Information: the right to receive information on 
what has been done or will be done (prompting 
data generation) 
Incentives to reward good and punish bad performance, 
and deter cheating on rules, promises, and 
commitments  
                                               
2 Different types of accountability (Schedler 1999: 22/23) may focus on the ‘Administrative’: the expediency and 
procedural correctness of bureaucratic practice; on the ‘Professional’: ethical standards of professionalism, such as 
medical, academic, and judicial professionalism; on the ‘Financial’: State officials use public money austerely, 
efficiently (VFM), appropriately; on the ‘Moral’: Evaluate political acts on the basis of prevailing normative 
standards (independent of formal rules and regulations); and on the ‘Legal’ The observance of legal rules, 
including whether legislative acts are in accordance with constitutional rules. These different types of 
accountability gain diverse institutional expressions. For instance, responsibility for exercising both political and 
moral accountability applies to citizens, civil associations, mass media, and opposition parties. Specialised 
agencies, such as an ombudsman or anticorruption agency, are responsible for administrative and financial 
accountability. Ethics commissions and disciplinary courts are instituted to safeguard professional accountability, 
whereas judicial systems are tasked with guaranteeing legal as well as constitutional accountability.  
3 Schedler’s key criteria of ‘information’ and ‘monitoring mechanisms’ overlap substantially with those labeled 
‘debate’ and ‘evidence’ by Droop, Isenman and Mlalazi’s (2008). The latter’s ‘ownership’ criterion, like Schedler’s 
‘incentives’ and ‘enforcement mechanisms’ is grounded in sets of rules that guide the conduct of parties in the 
accountability relation. However, whereas Schedler emphasises the ability to enforce compliance, the former note 
the critical importance of a ‘logic of participation’. Thus, within relationships of mutual accountability, the 
challenge is about building greater partnership, ownership and mutual responsibility that could lead to new 
additional commitments - perhaps somewhat contradictorily - “as much as it is to hold one another accountable” 
(p.5). This suggests that within the realm of international nutrition commitments, there may be place for logics of 
participation as well as logics of compliance.  
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Type of nutrition information examples:  
 Nutrition inputs (policies, finances, 
programmes) 
 Nutrition outputs (e.g. number of zinc 
supplements distributed) 
 Nutrition outcomes (e.g. stunting rate 
reductions) 
Examples of rules:  
 Human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights4 
 The expectation that the UK Prime Minister can be 
trusted to deliver on his promise to put in major 
efforts to reduce nutrition related child deaths by 
20% by 2016 
 Countries’ financial promises of support for food 
security made at G-8 Summits, such as at l’Aquila 
(2009), or at the N4G event in London (2013) will be 
delivered in time 
 The Rome Principles5 that govern AFSI investments 
Justification: accountable actors explain their 
decisions and engage in public dialogues with 
those who hold them accountable 
 E.g. DFID consults with civil society groups on 
its accountability strategy regarding N4G 
commitments  
Monitoring mechanisms prevent violation of rules, 
promises, and commitments from going unnoticed 
 E.g. the ONE Campaign and the US State 
Department monitoring disbursements on Aquila 
Food Security Initiative pledges  
 Enforcement mechanisms and punishment in case 
rules/promises/commitments are violated  
 E.g.: reputational loss if the UK Prime Minister is not 
putting in major efforts to reduce nutrition related 
child deaths.  
 E.g. for those CSOs who are sourcing new monies 
from members and allocate these to combat child 
undernutrition, the countries’ aid agency provides 
guaranteed £ for £ matched funding.   
 
The informational function of accountability is to generate data and evidence for public scrutiny about 
the nature of the nutrition problem. The explanatory function of accountability serves to bring diverse 
perspectives and the voices of a plurality of stakeholders into decisionmaking processes regarding 
appropriate interventions towards undernutrition reduction. Monitoring mechanisms are required to 
ascertain the extent to which those held accountable are delivering on their nutrition promises, pledges 
and commitments. Monitoring thus ensures that failings and successes in this respect will not go 
unnoticed. Finally, monitoring links closely with enforcement mechanisms that aim to link the 
performance of accountable actors towards delivering improved nutrition outcomes through rewards as 
well as penalties. For political leadership on nutrition, this is likely to take the shape of reputational 
gains and losses through public exposure. However other forms of reward and punishment may be 
                                               
4 Human rights can provide a platform for accountability and for empowering marginalised groups, by advocating 
highly consensual and value-driven principles as well as through the establishment of new normative/legislative 
instruments (Villar and Dodd 2005). 
5 AFSI investments follow the five Rome Principles of Sustainable Food Security laid out by 193 countries at the 
FAO-WFP-IFAD hosted Summit later that same year, to 1) invest in country-owned plans; 2) foster strategic 
coordination at national, regional and global levels; 3) strive for a comprehensive, twin-track approach to food 
security that consists of: a) direct action to immediately tackle hunger for the most vulnerable and b) medium and 
long-term  sustainable agricultural, food security, nutrition and rural development programs; 4) ensure a strong 
role for the multilateral system; and 5) ensure sustained and substantial commitment by all partners to investment 
in agriculture and food security and nutrition (US Government 2012a).  
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envisaged. For instance, in relations between donors and aid recipients, serious underperformance of 
the latter may result in suspension or termination of financial aid, whereas excellent performance may 
result in greater funding streams.  
 
Putting in place accountability mechanisms can thus help to achieve multiple objectives. Informed 
publics and reasoned debate will bring greater attention; stimulate learning, better and more timely 
action; and contribute to generating greater public commitment to act on nutrition. Furthermore, the 
monitoring and enforcement functions of accountability provide mechanisms and incentives to sustain 
the momentum of commitment to address nutrition.  
1.2 An overview of nutrition commitments made in international forums  
 
2013 stood out as a year within which nutrition featured prominently in international development 
agendas, resulting in the various new public commitments announced in international forums. 
However, other recent commitments set out in preceding years are also worthy of discussion.  
 
Hence, at the global level, major commitments to enhance nutrition include:  
 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
 
While the search for development goals post 2015 is ongoing, the current MDGs, established at the 2005 
World Summit in New York remain in place. Governments, donors and international bodies set out 
commitments to Eradicate Extreme Hunger and Poverty under MDG Goal 1, with a specific target (1C) 
to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. At a high-level 
event at the UN Headquarters on 25 September 2008, governments, foundations, businesses and civil 
society groups rallied around the call to slash poverty, hunger and disease by 2015, by announcing new 
commitments to meet the Millennium Development Goals. This gathering generated an estimated $16 
billion, including some $1.6 billion to bolster food security 
(http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml). A follow up 2010 Summit on the MDGs resulted in 
the Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health. 
 
Every Woman Every Child (EWEC) 
 
The UN Secretary-General’s Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health, Every Woman Every 
Child (EWEC), aims to mobilise global action to improve the health of women and children around the 
world. This broad goal explicitly includes nutrition aspects. EWEC works with leaders from 
governments, multilateral organisations, the private sector and civil society,6 and focuses on the 75 
countries which together account for more than 95 per cent of all maternal and child deaths in the 
world. EWEC aims to protect 88 million children from stunting, save the lives of 16 million women and 
children by 2015 and improve the lives of millions more. Over 260 partners have made commitments in 
                                               
6 Members include the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General, national and international non-
governmental organizations, WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF, H4+, ITU, OECD, African Union, PMNCH, UN Foundation, 
World Bank, Countdown to 2015, Health Metrics Network, Inter-Parliamentary Union, CDC, Norad, USAID, IHP+, 
mHealth Alliance, University of Aberdeen, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, among others (iERG 2012). 
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various forms (financial, policy, advocacy, innovation, monitoring and evaluation, etc.), including 
financial commitments to the tune of $40 billion made in September 2010. Many commitments aim to 
accelerate action towards the achievement of MDG 4 (reduce child mortality) and MDG 5 (improve 
maternal health) and to contribute to the overall goals 
(http://www.everywomaneverychild.org/commitments).  
 
World Health Assembly targets 
In May 2012, the World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making body of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), agreed on a new target: reducing the number of stunted children under the age of 
five by 40 per cent by 2025.  
Nutrition for Growth 
 
In June 2013, the Nutrition for Growth (N4G) summit organised by the UK and Brazilian Governments 
brought together governments, businesses, UN agencies, CSOs and scientific institutions, which all 
made commitments to do more to tackle undernutrition. These commitments are captured in the 
Nutrition for Growth Compact and in the accompanying Commitments Document. The collective 
ambition of those who committed was to: 
 
 Ensure that at least 500 million pregnant women and children under two are reached with 
effective nutrition interventions.  
 Prevent at least 20 million children under five from being stunted.  
 Save at least 1.7 million lives by reducing stunting, increasing breastfeeding, and through the 
treatment of severe acute malnutrition.  
(Anon 2013)  
 
The event secured new commitments of up to £2.7 billion ($4.15 billion) to tackle undernutrition up to 
2020, £1.9 billion ($2.9 billion) of which is core funding with the remainder secured through matched 
funding. The UK committed an additional £375 million of core funding and £280 million of matched 
funding from 2013 to 2020 (UK Government 2013). 
 
European Union 
 
During the N4G Conference in London, EU Commissioner Piebalgs announced the commitment to 
support partner countries in reducing stunting in children under five. The EU aims to contribute to 10 per 
cent of the WHA targets on stunting reduction, by at least seven million in 2025. It was accompanied by 
the pledge to allocate €3.5 billion during the 2014-2020 programming period to attain the EU's stunting 
target. 
 
Zero Hunger Challenge 
 
Launched in June 2012, the Zero Hunger Challenge, proposed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon 
asserts an ambitious commitment to ensure 100 per cent access to adequate food all year round, zero 
stunted children under two years of age, to ensure sustainability of all food systems, 100 per cent 
increase in smallholder productivity and income, and zero loss or waste of food (UN 2012). A raft of 
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country groupings, including the G77+China, Least Developed Countries, and the EU explicitly endorsed 
the Zero Hunger Challenge at the 67th UN General Assembly. It has been adopted by the 23 multilateral 
organisations that make up the High Level Task Force for Global Food Security.  
Food Assistance Convention 
The Food Assistance Convention (FAC) is an international development treaty designed to ensure that 
minimum levels of food are made available to help meet the emergency food needs of developing 
countries. Each Party to the Convention makes a minimum annual financial commitment of the level of 
food assistance they will support (in kind). The FAC replaces the previous Food Aid Convention (1999). 
The new FAC includes a broader toolbox of activities and products to capture a wider variety of food 
assistance interventions, including nutrition, and underscores the importance of not only the quantity of 
food, but also the quality. The FAC entered into Force on January 1, 2013. To date, of 14 signatories (13 
countries and the EU) to the FAC at the end of December last year, eight had deposited instruments of 
ratification, acceptance or approval: Austria, Canada, Denmark, EU, Finland, Japan, Switzerland and the 
US (http://foodassistanceconvention.org).  
 
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 
The New Alliance emerged from the G-8 Camp David summit in May 2012 to establish a public private 
partnership between governments, private sector and international donors and multilateral agencies. It 
aims to increase domestic and foreign private investments in African agriculture, take innovations that 
can enhance agricultural productivity to scale, and reduce the risk borne by vulnerable economies and 
communities. The Alliance aims to achieve sustained and inclusive agricultural growth and raise 50 
million people out of poverty over the next ten years (US Government 2012b; 
http://iif.un.org/content/new-alliance-food-security-and-nutrition#sthash.3kl0rCeU.hyB4nioh.dpuf). 
The New Alliance has been framed as ‘additive’ and complementary to the L’Aquila commitments (see 
below), and represents a renewed focus on private sector approaches to achieving food security (ONE 
Campaign 2012). To improve nutritional outcomes and reduce child stunting, the G-8 members 
committed to (US Government 2012b):  
 
 Actively support the SUN movement;  
 Maintain robust programs to further reduce child stunting;  
 Improve tracking and disbursements for nutrition across sectors and ensure coordination of 
nutrition activities across sectors;  
 It will further support the accelerated release, adoption and consumption of bio-fortified crop 
varieties, crop diversification, and related technologies to improve the nutritional quality of food 
in Africa, and develop a nutrition policy research agenda and support the efforts of African 
institutions, civil society and private sector partners to establish regional nutritional learning 
centers  
L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI)  
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In 2009, during the L’Aquila Summit, the G-8 and other donors collectively pledged more than $22 
billion over three years to ensure a comprehensive strategy focused on sustainable agriculture 
development. It initiated the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative, with a founding mandate to focus on 
accountability and to ensure follow through on the commitments made. 
InterAction 
On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September, InterAction, an alliance of 198 U.S. based 
civil society organisations, pledged more than $1 billion in private, nongovernment funding for 2012-
2015 to improve food security and nutrition worldwide (US Government 2012a).7 
 
International commitments: who is accountable, to whom?  
 
The discussion of commitments above shows that accountability relations are characterised by a 
substantial variety of nutrition actors (donor and aid receiving governments, CSOs, private companies) 
each having distinct principals that they are accountable to. This produces a fairly ill-defined patchwork 
of accountability relations (Table 2), some being more strongly pronounced than others. It should be 
noted that were these actors formally sign up to international nutrition commitments, this generates a 
new set of accountability relationships, additional to those set out in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Institutional actors making international nutrition commitments: who is accountable, to 
whom? 
Actors (Agent) Accountable to whom (Principal) 
 Primary Secondary 
Developing country 
governments  
Domestic citizens, 
communities including through 
parliament 
Donors in case of aid relationships in 
spirit of mutual accountability 
Multilateral financing agencies Donor countries - 
UN Agencies UN General Secretary and 
General Assembly 
Donors in case of aid relationships 
Bilateral donors Domestic citizens in donor 
countries including through 
parliament 
Developing country governments in 
spirit of mutual accountability 
INGOs Donating members, funders  Citizens, communities and governments 
in countries in which they operate, and 
in which they have domicile 
Civil society organisations  Donating members, funders Citizens, communities and governments 
in countries in which they operate 
Private sector businesses Owners, shareholders, 
customers 
Citizens, communities and governments 
in countries in which they operate, and 
in which they have domicile  
                                               
7 World Vision, Heifer International, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children and ChildFund International have 
pledged to invest more than $900 million in this effort 
(http://www.interaction.org/sites/default/files/09.27.2012%20Member%20Impact%20on%20Hunger%20-
%20Final.docx_.pdf). 
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Foundations, philanthropic 
organisations 
Private individuals and 
governing boards  
- 
 
As nutrition commitments proliferate, the patchwork is mended regularly, reflecting that international 
public nutrition commitments are often made in as yet weakly institutionalised environments, within 
which it is unclear who exactly holds whom to account for what, by when, how and in accordance to 
what rules and norms.  
 
Whereas Parliaments could in principle assert a mandate to critically review their governments on their 
performance delivering on nutrition commitments, in practice this often does not happen in a 
structured manner. International aid effectiveness campaigns, such as the Paris Principles and Accra 
Action Agenda on Aid Effectiveness (2008), and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-
operation (2011) promote relationships of mutual accountability between donors and recipient 
countries. This seeks to enhance transparency in the use of development resources, to strengthen public 
support for national policies and development assistance.8 For aid recipients, they seek to (a) strengthen 
as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets and (b) 
reinforce participatory approaches by systematically involving a broad range of development partners 
when formulating and assessing progress in implementing national development strategies. Donors 
commit, in turn, to provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to 
enable partner authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens. 
Both partner countries and donors further commit to jointly assess mutual progress in implementing 
agreed commitments on aid effectiveness.  
 
In practice, mutual accountability may not always fit the Accra and Busan principles quite as well. Where 
legal and democratic avenues of compliance are non-existing or weak, such as in arms control, 
disarmament, or cooperation on international environmental issues (e.g. Kyoto Protocol), mutual 
accountability often involves a stronger ‘logic of participation’ than ‘logic of compliance’ (Droop et al, 
2008). Particularly as there is usually no single over-arching authority to monitor and enforce good 
behaviour, and as the level of commitment and ownership also varies between participants, maintaining 
participation and gradually building further commitment through a process of contestation and 
deliberation is seen as a more feasible approach. The challenge is hence to build commitment, mutual 
responsibility, ownership and partnership, as much as it is to hold one another accountable. 
Nevertheless, examples of approaches that do incorporate a clear logic of compliance can also be found 
within the realm of international development, as will be shown in section 1.3.  
 
Before we move on exploring the key focus of this paper, that is how accountability elements such as 
information, evidence, dialogue, monitoring and enforcement are given shape in respect of the various 
international commitments on nutrition, we briefly touch on a related matter. Delivering on 
international commitments will require additional efforts by the various nutrition actors that signed up.  
Pledges and promises need to be turned into programmatic and policy activities and in delivery of 
nutrition services. Their effectiveness and success will depend on accountability mechanisms at national 
and subnational level that while feeding in to the accountability mechanisms set up for the international 
                                               
8 At the World Summit on Food Security 2009, donors agreed to the Rome Principles, a series of new 
commitments to improve aid effectiveness in agriculture and food security. 
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commitments, are quite distinct. While their detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, we 
briefly discuss aspects of accountability for such nutrition services and policy interventions.  
 
Accountability for nutrition services 
The influential World Development Report 2004 sets out that strong accountability relationships – 
especially between decision makers, service providers and clients – are key to the better performance of 
public service provision. It links the public with service providers through a short and a long route. The 
short route concerns the need for (nutrition) service providers to report to their clients. The long route 
refers to how service providers report to senior bureaucrats, who themselves are accountable to 
democratically elected leaders, who in turn are accountable to the electorate.  
 
Various mechanisms support short and long routes to accountability between individuals and collectives 
in their capacity as citizens, and individuals in their capacity as public (state) officials. Licensing and 
accreditation (of physicians, nurses, nutritionists); public financing that link central government 
contributions to the amount and quality of services provided by local governments; and quality 
assurance policies, standards and benchmarks can all contribute to accountability of service providers 
and help to improve the quality of care and client satisfaction in nutrition services. Moreover, within 
organisations or bureaucracies, subordinate officials (agents) are held to account for their performance 
by superiors (principals). Principal-agent relationships are an important institutional feature that 
citizens can sometimes successfully exploit (Gupta 2012) to make low level officials (indirectly) more 
accountable to them and to offer some level of check on excessive use of discretion in the application of 
(nutrition) policies, programmes and rules. Furthermore, the state comprises a wide range of bodies and 
agencies, between which accountability mechanisms exist. Montesquieu’s classic checks and balances 
between the legislative, executive and judicial wings of state aim to achieve accountability and a check 
on the unbridled exercise of power. Moreover, diverse agencies may exercise ‘horizontal’ forms of 
accountability within these wings of the state. Critically, this means that the state offers a wide range of 
potential forums that citizens or advocacy coalitions can target as allies for holding other government 
bodies to account.  
 
In theory and sometimes in practice, market mechanisms can also introduce elements of performance 
accountability (between service providers and customers), e.g. by introducing competition between 
service providers on the basis of performance information made public (Brinkerhoff 2004). Finally, 
anthropological studies suggest looking beyond principal-agent relationships, and formal social and 
professional norms, to the informal and practical norms that govern (nutrition) service delivery. Actual 
service delivery may be governed by institutionalised practical (social and professional) norms that 
operate side by side or actively violate formal professional or social norms, and that have their own logic 
of accountability. For instance, the poor nursing care practices in African hospitals for impoverished 
elderly people can only be explained by such institutionalised practical norms, because they routinely 
violate professional norms (i.e. the Hippocratic oath), official organisational norms (hospitals’ 
declaration of care responsibilities) and otherwise common social norms (respect for the elderly) (Olivier 
de Sardan 2008).  
 
Following this brief discussion of accountability for nutrition services and policy interventions, the next 
section returns to information, evidence, dialogue, monitoring and enforcement aspects in the various 
international commitments on nutrition, as presented above in Table 1. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 address 
answerability aspects of current nutrition accountability arrangements, by looking at what type of 
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nutrition information is currently used for accountability purposes, who is involved in monitoring to hold 
which actors to account, and with what kind of incentives and enforcement systems? Section 1.4 
identifies major gaps, and 1.5 offers suggestions on what may be done to address these.  
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1.3 Answerability for nutrition: information and evidence 
 
The informational function of accountability is to generate data and evidence for public scrutiny about 
the nature of the nutrition problem. This section presents a brief discussion of the kind of nutrition data 
that may be desirable generating or collating to allow for greater accountability for international 
nutrition commitments. It looks at three aspects: nutrition outcome data; nutrition output data; 
nutrition input data. Unless otherwise specified, the focus here is on the public sector. As there are 
potentially numerous indicators for nutrition inputs, outputs and outcomes, the discussion below offers 
illustrative examples, but does not aim to be exhaustive. 
 
Nutrition outcome data 
 
The chief purpose of this data is to provide insights into the current nutritional status for targeted 
groups (notably children) and in trends (progress/regress) in nutrition outcomes and hence potentially 
allows for tracking progress towards those international nutrition commitment that explicitly identify 
quantitative targets. However, major anthropometric indicators for child undernutrition outcomes are 
measured insufficiently frequently to adequately inform public policy. In many high burden countries, 
stunting (height for age), wasting (weight for height) and undernourishment (weight for age) data are 
collected through statistically representative nutrition surveys at best every three to five years, and 
often less frequently. Various parties are now experimenting with methodological innovations 
employing real time monitoring techniques and mobile phone technology. While offering promise, right 
now real time monitoring techniques are largely untested (Barnett et al. 2013) and the jury remains out 
as to whether they yet offer a serious methodological and practical alternative to current nutrition 
outcome monitoring approaches.  
 
Nutrition input data 
 
Nutrition input data can reflect efforts that governments make to address nutrition issues, and are 
based on the assumption that these efforts contribute to improved nutrition outcomes either through 
direct and indirect interventions, or through creating enabling environments (Gillespie, Haddad et al. 
2013). Government inputs can take the shape of financial, policy and legal instruments, and the 
development of adequate capacity to deliver these (by the public, private or third sector). Assessing 
these inputs can potentially be done using a wide range of indicators. Here we offer a few suggestions.  
 
Basic financial indicators would give insight in the budget allocation patterns supporting nutrition 
policies and programmes, and would show actual budget spending. More advanced indicators could 
include aspects of, for instance, cost efficiency and cost effectiveness, and the relative financial 
contributions made by governments (through general taxation, or social insurance mechanisms) and 
donors. Basic indicators on policy could note the existence, and key features of direct nutrition policies 
(e.g. vitamin A supplementation), indirect nutrition policies (e.g. child grants) and policies that 
constitute important enabling environments for achieving enhanced nutrition outcomes (e.g. equal 
economic rights for women and men enshrined in law and effectively exercised in practice).  
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Indicators could also focus on substantive policy elements: e.g. time bound targets; priorities for action 
etc., and could take note whether or not explanations and justifications are provided for the policy 
choices made (for instance in making policy documents easily accessible), thus enabling public scrutiny 
and debate about assumptions underlying nutrition policy. Moreover, because public policies are only as 
good as they are delivered, data on the quality of nutrition policy implementation would be very 
important. This may take the shape of administrative data, for instance on the policy outputs produced, 
or impacts (wherever these could be established with rigour). Such administrative data could well be 
triangulated by taking account of the subjective experience of these policies by actual beneficiaries and 
by those beneficiaries who are supposed to benefit, but for one reason or another are not (exclusion 
error). 
 
Finally, as regulatory frameworks and enforcement mechanisms will remain ineffective in the absence 
of institutional capacity to implement these, input data on the capacity to deliver key nutrition 
interventions could be valuable. For instance, by setting out the number of (additional) nutrition staff 
recruited, their education qualifications, or indicators regarding the availability of physical infrastructure 
at subnational (district/province/etc) level for implementing nutrition programmes.  
 
While private sector companies have a critical role to play in food systems that make affordable 
nutritious food accessible to the poor, and increasingly are signed up partners in international nutrition 
commitments such as the New Alliance, as yet, data on their contributions are weakly developed. New 
data forms need to be developed that can give clear insight in nutrition inputs and output contributions, 
but that also strike a meaningful balance between commercial confidentiality and public accountability 
interests, that can drive greater commitments in future.  
 
Similarly, where international NGOs or alliances of civil society groups sign up to international nutrition 
commitments, they are to be held accountable for their performance. Some groups such as WorldVision 
and Interaction have now started to self-report on their delivery on EWEC and Nutrition for Growth 
commitments (see section 1.4). 
 
Nutrition output data 
 
Nutrition output data show the outputs produced as a result of nutrition inputs. They may contribute to 
a picture of how policies and programmes are implemented, and may suggest (but not prove) the likely 
success or failure of programmes to establish enhanced nutrition outcomes. For instance, output 
indicators may report on the number of latrines built for sanitation purposes, or on the beneficiaries 
who received Vitamin A supplements in absolute (e.g. one million children) or relative terms (e.g. a 
coverage rate of 90 per cent of children between 6-59 months of age). Finally, in a range of countries, 
legal efforts have been made to enshrine citizens’ right to food into legislation and to put in place legal 
instruments advancing food and nutrition security outcomes, such as enshrining the International Code 
of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS) into domestic law.  
 
While data on such input indicators is now being collected, arguably these need to be complemented 
with a set of related output indicators that comment on the quality, enforcement and justiciability of 
such laws and rights. For instance, with regards the ICMBS, output indicators with higher resolution 
could include the number of violations registered, court cases commenced and completed, and the 
number of convictions.  
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1.4 Monitoring mechanisms and means of dialogue 
 
Having discussed potential nutrition outcome, input and output indicators that may be part of 
accountability initiatives, this section considers which indicators are currently being monitored, by 
whom, and what kind of mechanisms are being used supporting aspects of answerability, justification 
and dialogue. We find that the various commitments are using a range of monitoring mechanisms that 
contain some form of explanation, justification and dialogue between accountable parties and those 
holding them to account. These mechanisms include public reports, annually or otherwise, statistics on 
key progress indicators delivering these commitments, resolutions by governing bodies such as the 
World Health Assembly, and findings from evaluation platforms.   
 
1.4.1 Monitoring global nutrition commitments 
 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
 
Country-led monitoring and evaluation systems have been critical to assessing progress towards 
achieving the MDGs, which have fed into globally established databases to monitor the MDGs, such as 
DevInfo and ChildInfo. Besides UN Agencies, regional agencies (CEPAL, CEDLAS, ESCAP and Eurostat) 
and various development banks routinely monitor performance on MDGs. For instance, in Latin 
America, CEPAL and the World Bank’s Latin America Country (LAC) group monitor MDG Goal 1 
progress (on poverty reduction and hunger). These agencies use household surveys to develop their 
own poverty measures, or assess the quality of national statistical agency poverty estimates. These 
regional agencies often provide a second or third source of expert opinion for explaining inconsistencies 
in national and global monitoring of poverty (McLeod 2007).   
  
Every Woman Every Child (EWEC) 
 
EWEC provides a good example of how to integrally develop new institutional mechanisms to monitor 
and foster greater accountability towards commitments at both international and national levels. As 
part of EWEC, a Commission on Information and Accountability for Women’s and Children’s Health was 
established, which in May 2012 presented 10 recommendations to improve accountability in countries 
and globally. An international Expert Review Group was then established to: 
 
 Assess the extent to which all stakeholders honour their commitments to the Global Strategy 
and the Commission, including the United States’ $40 billion of financial commitments; 
 Review progress in implementation of the recommendations of the Commission;  
 Assess progress towards greater transparency in the flow of resources and achieving results;  
 Identify obstacles to implementing both the Global Strategy and the Commission’s 
recommendations;  
 Identify good practice, including in policy and service delivery, accountability arrangements and 
value-for-money approaches relating to the health of women and children and   
 Make publicly accessible recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the accountability 
framework developed by the Commission 
(http://www.who.int/woman_child_accountability/ierg/en/).  
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Subsequently, country accountability frameworks (CAFs) have been developed to guide 
implementation of aspects of the global strategy, combining country assessments and (costed) 
roadmaps. The approach towards developing the CAFs are framed around the broad health goals of the 
Strategy, and thus contain distinct aspects that are of immediate relevance to nutrition, often under the 
banner of Maternal, Neonatal and Child Health (MNCH), such as action towards improving civil 
registration systems.  
 
Countdown to 2015 has also taken on a role in ensuring accountability for fulfilment of these 
commitments. It annually reports on coverage, equity, health systems, health policies and financing 
indicators (World Health Organization and UNICEF 2013). 
 
World Health Assembly targets 
In order to achieve the WHA child stunting target, the World Health Assembly (WHA) has endorsed a 
comprehensive draft implementation plan on maternal, infant and young child nutrition and called on 
member states to translate this into national policy and law. This plan contains a set of global nutrition 
targets (http://www.who.int/pmnch/media/events/2013/au_policy_brief_nu).  
 
The WHO Executive Board reports on an annual basis to the WHA on the implementation progress of 
this plan, and also reports on the implementation of the International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk 
Substitutes and related Health Assembly resolutions (WHO 2012b). Member states are urged to 
implement the recommendations provided by the Commission on Information and Accountability for 
Women’s and Children’s Health to improve the accountability of results and resources by:  
 
(1) Strengthening the accountability mechanisms for health in their own countries;  
(2) Strengthening their capacity to monitor, including utilising local evidence, and evaluating progress 
to improve their own performance;  
(3) Contributing to the strengthening and harmonisation of existing international mechanisms to track 
progress on all commitments made. 
 
Nutrition for Growth 
 
A number of steps are being developed to track individual commitments made at the 2013 Nutrition for 
Growth Summit, also aiming to embed these commitments within the SUN monitoring and evaluation 
process. Tentatively, these include: 
 
 Inviting each of the respective SUN networks to take responsibility for tracking the 
commitments made by their constituent members in a consistent, comparable manner. The 
source of data for tracking the commitment will also be agreed.   
 SUN countries will report their progress periodically to the SUN Secretariat through the SUN 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework.   
 If needed, the UK will help support the respective networks to ensure that the data can be 
effectively gathered by helping to support a technical assistance facility to draw down on. 
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 The monitoring data will be reviewed by the consortium producing a Global Nutrition Report 
and compiled in an annex of the report, ideally using a simple traffic light system to determine 
commitments which are off track, on track or delivered.  
(Anon 2013) 
 
The World Bank’s (WB) N4G commitment on nutrition includes to increase the share of agriculture 
projects with an explicit focus on nutrition (currently at 12 per cent). This commitment was already set 
out in its Agricultural Action Plan FY13-15. The Bank annually conducts an ex post portfolio analysis, and 
identifies the number of projects funded having an explicit mention of the nutrition sensitive aspects of 
agricultural production and marketing in agricultural projects as a share of all agricultural projects. 
Internally, this ratio is reported to the board (as part of the reporting on the Agricultural Action Plan). 
Regional WB managers decide on whether or not to adopt nutrition sensitive agricultural investments.  
 
European Union 
 
The EU Communication ’Enhancing Maternal and Children Nutrition in external assistance: an EU policy 
framework’ was adopted by the European Commission on the 12th March 2013. It sets out strategic 
priorities to achieve its aims of reducing the number of under-fives suffering from stunting and wasting. 
The Commission is drafting an Action Plan on nutrition which outlines in detail how the Commission 
plans to reach its commitment to reducing stunting, and towards helping to deliver WHA and N4G 
targets. The Action Plan will address how strategic objectives are to be attained, as well as detailing the 
accountability framework, looking at resource tracking and measurement of impact. The Action Plan is 
expected to be ready by the first half of 2014 (European Commission 2013). Furthermore, at the time of 
writing (February 2014), consultations are ongoing on how to develop National Evaluation Platforms 
and integrated Nutrition Information Systems 
 
Zero Hunger Challenge 
 
The Zero Hunger Challenge did not set a deadline for achieving its ambitious aims (Ford 2012), so the 
Challenge may perhaps be better understood as a statement of ambition than as an actual accountable 
commitment. Yet, fragmented monitoring efforts are made at global, regional and national level, 
including recommendations by the UN Secretary-General’s Food Security Task Force for a ‘faster and 
more precise’ way of measuring hunger and food insecurity that is to be tested by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Moreover, an independent and global 
Community for Zero Hunger was launched to support, and monitor the UN Zero Hunger Challenge 
(http://www.zerohungercommunity.org/). 
 
In a few countries, e.g. in  Barbados and Antigua, a Plan of Action 2013-2014 has been jointly prepared 
by the Government and collaborating agencies (FAO, IICA, PAHO, PMA, ECLAC), inspired by the Zero 
Hunger Challenge (Government of Antigua and Barbuda 2013). It uses a multi-stakeholder dialogue, and 
a M&E Platform9 has been set up to assess progress regarding Action Plan objectives. At the regional 
level, the Asia-Pacific Zero Hunger Challenge was launched in April 2013.  
 
                                               
9 http://www.mezhcab.org/ 
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Food Assistance Convention 
The FAC tracks the value or quantity commitment of food aid commodities, cash and vouchers and 
nutritional interventions.  After each calendar year, the Parties report their food assistance operations, 
detailing how they meet their respective commitments, including specific reporting on support for 
nutrition interventions. The FAC Secretariat produces a report each year (beginning in 2014) that will list 
the Eligible Activities or Eligible Products that each Party provided in order to meet their commitment. 
 The report will include specific reporting on nutrition. The first report will be available from the 
Secretariat on June 30, 2014, and on an annual basis thereafter. The Rules of Procedure and 
Implementation of the Food Assistance Convention (2012) do neither set out what rules govern the 
effective delivery of commitments nor set out any enforcement mechanisms 
(http://www.foodassistanceconvention.org/convention/RulesofProcedure.pdf). 
 
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 
In order to achieve the commitments set out by the New Alliance, Cooperation Frameworks to 
implement the New Alliance have been created for six countries: Ghana, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Cote 
D’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Mozambique (US Government 2012b). 
L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI)  
 
An internal AFSI working group has monitored disbursements towards financial commitments made in 
2008. By 2012, AFSI donors reported on a substantial portion of each donor’s investments in food 
security investments in a subset of developing countries. They rightly argued that making tables with 
disbursements vs commitments publicly available was a meaningful step toward increasing 
accountability and the transparency of G-8 commitments (US Government 2012a). However, it should 
be noted that this only happened towards the end of the AFSI period. In the meanwhile, external actors 
such as the ONE Campaign tried to monitor the delivery of AFSI commitments, to be highly critical of 
the opacity concerning the additionality of these commitments to ODA. It emerged that about only one 
third ($6.8 billion) of the $22 billion pledged involved new resources, additional to previously planned 
expenditures. This amount was highly similar to the $6.7 billion which was not disbursed by 2012; as 
affirmed by an AFSI working group which assessed that 67 per cent of the total commitment was 
disbursed. Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom had fully 
disbursed their commitments (http://iif.un.org/content/laquila-food-security-
initiative#sthash.3GF4wOua.dpuf; US Government 2012a).  
 
InterAction 
 
Starting in 2013, InterAction (2012b) is now making annual reports at the UN General Assembly on 
disbursements towards its 1 billion dollar funding commitment towards addressing nutrition and food 
insecurity.  
 
Table 4 provides an overview of commitments and current monitoring arrangements.  
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Table 4: Monitoring nutrition commitments 
Who 
commits? 
Which commitment? Who monitors?  What? How? 
 
EWEC  
 
Saving 16 million lives by 
2015, protecting 88 million 
children from stunting, 
advancing the control of 
deadly diseases such as 
malaria, HIV/AIDS, and 
ensuring access for women 
and children to quality 
facilities and skilled health 
workers 
 
Financial commitments of 
US$ 40 billion made in 
September 2010 
 
 
International 
Expert Review 
Group (iERG) 
 
Countdown to 
2015 
 
WHA 
iERG 
assesses the 
extent to 
which 
stakeholders 
honour their 
commitmen
ts to the 
Global 
Strategy 
and the 
Commission
; inc. the 
US$ 40 
billion of 
commitmen
ts  
iERG Reports annually to the 
UN-GA through WHO’s 
Director-General. The 
Commission on Information 
and Accountability for 
Women’s and Children’s Health 
proposed a set of core 
indicators for monitoring 
country progress towards its 
recommendations. WHA 
resolutions comment on 
progress and encourage 
member states to implement 
World 
Health 
Assembly 
Reducing the number of 
stunted children under the 
age of 5 by 40 per cent by 
2025 
WHO Executive 
Board  
Member 
States 
monitor and 
evaluate 
their policies 
and 
programme
s, with 
support 
from WHO 
Member States periodically 
report to WHA on 
implementation status of 
resolution 
N4G 
 
Prevent at least 20 million 
children under 5 from being 
stunted. Save at least 1.7 
million lives by reducing 
stunting, by increasing 
breastfeeding, and through 
the treatment of severe 
acute malnutrition. Ensure 
that at least 500 million 
pregnant women and 
children under two are 
reached with effective 
nutrition interventions.  
Financial pledges 
exceeding $25 billion 
Mechanism 
under 
development, 
tentatively 
involves SUN 
networks, SUN 
Secretariat 
 
Group of 
core 
partners, 
chaired by 
UK govt to 
lead. Close 
cooperation 
with SUN 
Lead Group. 
UK and 
Brazil 
ministers 
review   
Annual Global Progress reports  
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EU Support partner countries 
to reduce stunting by 7 
million children under 5 
between 2014-2020 (10% 
of WHA target). Also to 
contribute to WHA target 
to reduce the number of 
children under 5 who are 
wasted  
 
A pledge to allocate €3.5 
Billion during the 2014-
2020 programming period 
to attain the EU's stunting 
target  
European 
Commission 
(Commissioner 
Piebalgs)  
The 
performanc
e of EU 
investments 
in nutrition 
in 9 African 
countries  
 
The extent 
to which 3 
strategic 
objectives 
are achieved  
Country Cooperation 
Frameworks with 9 African 
countries10 set specific nutrition 
objectives and targets up to 
2022 
 
The EC is drafting an Action 
Plan on nutrition (release: 2014) 
which outlines in detail how to 
reach its commitments, inc. an 
accountability framework that 
looks at resource tracking and 
measurement of impact 
Consultations on NEPN/NIS are 
ongoing. 
InterAction Collective of US based 
pledged $1 billion for food 
security and nutrition  
No specific 
body, the 
general public  
  
On financial 
disburseme
nts vs 
pledges  
InterAction presents annual 
reports on pledges and 
disbursements at UN-GA, 
starting in 2014  
Zero 
Hunger 
Challenge  
1. 100% access to adequate 
food all year round. 2. Zero 
stunted children less than 2 
years. 3. All food systems 
are sustainable. 4. 100% 
increase in smallholder 
productivity and income 5. 
Zero loss or waste of food 
 
UN Secretary 
General overall, 
with support 
from regional 
(e.g. ESCAP) 
and nationally 
determined 
mechanisms  
At global level: 
Community for 
Zero Hunger 
Progress 
towards 
achieving 5 
global 
objectives; 
or against 
nationally 
determined 
objectives 
e.g. in Antigua and Barbados, a 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Platform assesses progress 
towards objectives of a national 
Action Plan 
 
 
MDGs 
 
MDG 1: 50% reduction on 
1990 hunger levels by 2015 
 
UN General 
Assembly 
UN Statistics 
Division MDG 
Indicators; and 
the MDG 
monitor, 
http://www.md
gmonitor.org;  
the World Bank 
(www.develop
mentgoals.com
) 
Indicators 
are 
identified 
for each of 
the MDGs 
 
UN Agencies distribute 
monitoring tasks, as per 
UNDAFs. E.g. WHO reports to 
WHA on annual basis (until 
2015) health related MDGs 
4,5.11 Development banks, 
regional agencies also monitor 
New 
Alliance for 
Food 
The Alliance aims to 
achieve sustained and 
inclusive agricultural 
A Leadership 
Council will 
drive and track 
Indicators  
unclear  
Annual reports to the G-8 and 
African Union on progress 
towards achieving the 
                                               
10 These concern: Benin, Malawi, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and Mozambique 
(European Commission 2013)  
11 MDG 4 concerns child mortality, MDG 5 maternal mortality. 
 19 
 
Security 
and 
Nutrition  
growth and raise 50 million 
people out of poverty by 
2022. G-8 members pledge 
to maintain robust 
programs to further reduce 
child stunting. Commit to 
improve tracking and 
disbursements for nutrition 
across sectors and ensure 
coordination of nutrition 
activities across sectors. 
Eighty private sector 
companies have pledged 
over $5 billion in support  
implementation 
The ONE 
Campaign;  
InterAction 
externally 
monitor 
commitments under the New 
Alliance, including 
commitments made by the 
private sector  
L’ Aquila 
Food 
Security 
Initiative 
(AFSI) 
G-8 and other donors 
collectively pledged more 
than $22 billion over 3  
years (2009-2012) to 
ensure a comprehensive 
strategy focused on 
sustainable agriculture 
development 
AFSI 
Working 
Groups on 
AR4D and 
MFDR 
 
The ONE 
Campaign 
AFSI donors 
report on 
pledges, 
commitmen
ts and  
disburseme
nts 
  
Donor reports were made 
public towards end of reporting 
period  
 
 
Following this brief discussion of monitoring efforts regarding major international nutrition 
commitments made by various governments, international bodies and other agencies, the following 
section looks at more generic monitoring tools for nutrition outcomes, inputs and outputs that are not 
specifically linked to pre-defined government commitments.  
 
1.4.2 Generic nutrition monitoring tools 
 
Key nutrition outcome indicators such as stunting, wasting and undernourishment are monitored at 
country level through demographic and health surveys (www.measuredhs.com) and Multiple Indicators 
Cluster Surveys (MICS), using nationally representative sampling techniques. These survey findings are 
publicly accessible through the internet. Non-anthropometric indicators on food consumption and food 
expenditure are collected through household budget and expenditure surveys, however these rarely use 
methodologies allowing for comparisons across countries and over time. Several indices have also been 
developed that allow for cross-country comparisons for nutrition outcomes. These tools chiefly support 
the accountability of governments towards citizens by offering cross-country comparisons. A much 
wider range of agencies, movements and instruments also provide important information on nutrition 
inputs and outputs that can support accountability initiatives. Below we set out the main ones, starting 
with general tools, followed by a discussion of various indices that are of relevance.12 
 
                                               
12 Currently, the Child Investment Fund Foundation is in the process of commissioning a first Global Nutrition 
Report, for annual publication starting in 2014.  
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The WHO Landscape Analysis assesses stakeholders' commitment and capacity to scale up evidence-
informed interventions. It aims to ascertain country readiness to accelerate action on nutrition, in order 
to guide where to invest and how to best invest in nutrition interventions. The Landscape Analysis 
contains three components, reflecting diverse aspects of nutrition inputs, outputs and outcomes. A 
development of country typologies for ‘readiness’ draws on nutrition input data on policy and 
governance, and uses health care capacity data as a proxy for nutrition capacity. In depth Country 
Assessments concern a country’s commitment, capacities and resources, and identifies promising 
actions that could be scaled up to improve nutrition. Its main aims include establishing the current 
status of nutrition action in a country, thus allowing future progress to be tracked against that baseline. 
Finally, the Nutrition Landscape Information System (NLiS) is a web based tool that offers users 
automated country profiles and user-defined downloadable data regarding causes of malnutrition and 
the status of a country's nutrition, health, and development outcomes 
(http://www.who.int/nutrition/landscape_analysis/en/). It also reports on a set of capacity related 
variables. 
 
REACH 
 
The UN inter-agency partnership (FAO, UNICEF, WHO, WFP and IFAD) REACH, (Renewed Efforts 
against Child Hunger and Undernutrition) operates at country level (in 12 high-burden countries) to 
build institutional capacity and facilitate a multi-sectoral process to help national governments plan, 
prioritise and manage more effectively nutrition actions among multiple stakeholders. REACH is placing 
a strong emphasis on analytics and monitoring & evaluation as it supports countries in assessing the 
current nutrition situation and facilitates continuous monitoring of implementation progress.  
  
Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN)  
 
The initiation of the SUN movement in 2010 brought together fragmented voices amongst 
development partners and aid recipient countries to closely work towards a unified approach addressing 
undernutrition. SUN membership now extends to 42 countries. SUN has developed a Results 
Frameworks that evolve around goals such as universal access to nutritious food, clean water, 
sanitation, healthcare and social protection; increased adoption of practices that contribute to good 
nutrition; optimal growth of children, demonstrated as reduced levels of stunting; and improved micro-
nutrient status (SUN 2012). SUN uses a dashboard to show members’ progress on key nutrition input, 
output and outcome indicators. The SUN’s tracking system is used to share an appreciation of countries’ 
preparedness for scaling up and accelerate progress. There are three stages identified: taking stock and 
starting up; ready for scaling up; and scaling up rapidly to deliver results. Results are annually portrayed 
in the SUN Movement Progress Report which is released in September each year. Country analyses 
(fiches) are publicly accessible on the SUN website.  
 
While the Results Framework constitutes an important monitoring tool for the donors, the SUN process 
also constitutes multisectoral and multistakeholder platforms that are designed to enhance 
constructive dialogue, information sharing and answerability between governments and citizens, 
private sector and civil society organisations. The SUN movement is guided by a ’multi-stakeholder 
stewardship’ approach. Key bodies involved concern (Mannar 2012: 4-5): 
 
 21 
 
 Lead Group: Strategic guidance for the Movement is provided by the SUN Lead Group. The 
Group is charged with providing high-level leadership and strengthening global visibility of 
nutrition and the SUN Movement. Nominated by the UN Secretary-General, the 27-member 
Lead Group includes heads of state from developing countries, civil society leaders, donors, 
business leaders and UN agency directors.  
 Country Network: As part of the commitment to scale up nutrition, each country joining the 
Movement must appoint a national Focal Point, a high-level individual with the ability and 
access to serve as the point of coordination and mobilise teams across government ministries, 
external partners and the broader community. The identification of Focal Points addresses a key 
concern highlighted in the 2008 Lancet Series, namely the lack of a clear point of contact for 
nutrition. 
 Networks: Stakeholders, including all national Focal Points, are organised into five constituent 
Networks (Civil Society, Business, Donors, UN System) designed to encourage sharing of best 
practices and facilitate communication regarding country needs. Where there are opportunities 
or needs to engage support and build capacity in technical expertise, resources or other needs 
for strategic guidance, the SUN Movement facilitates communication between members of the 
Country Network and leaders of other Networks that bring together groups in support of SUN 
countries. 
 SUN Secretariat: The Secretariat, headed by Dr. David Nabarro, the UN Secretary General’s 
Special Representative for Food Security and Nutrition, serves as the point of coordination 
between the Lead Group and the constituent Networks. The Secretariat works to ensure that 
country needs are being addressed, while also monitoring progress, providing guidance on 
prioritised actions and creating a shared space for advocates across the global community.  
 
The SUN Movement aims to ensure that all stakeholders that can play a role in advancing nutrition 
goals are following through on commitments and are accountable to both countries and others in the 
Movement. An accountability framework (Figure 1) introduced in the SUN Movement Strategy 
summarises the expectations and the means through which the Movement will track adherence. 
Stakeholders within and outside SUN countries commit to seven principles which are fundamental to 
the achievement of these objectives. These include being transparent about impact; being inclusive, 
through multi-stakeholder partnerships; being rights-based and being mutually accountable such that 
all stakeholders feel responsible for and are held collectively accountable to the joint commitments 
(SUN 2012).  
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Figure 1: SUN Movement Accountability Framework 
 
 
Tracking of progress is undertaken at country level under the responsibility of SUN Government Focal 
Point(s), responsible for the coordination of internal and external assistance for Scaling Up Nutrition. It 
is a joint in-country activity that involves representatives from government ministries and departments, 
as well as from the donor agencies and development banks, the UN system, civil society, business and  
 researchers. They collectively analyse and assess progress in these four processes, identify constraints 
and work out how best to move forward. Using, and building on, the in-country established monitoring 
systems, they also track changes and analyse bottlenecks in (a) the intended scale and actual coverage  
of specific nutrition interventions, (b) the implementation of nutrition-sensitive strategies and (c) 
commitments (from domestic and external sources) for financial support to Scaling Up Nutrition. The 
SUN Movement Secretariat works with the Government Focal Points as they track progress and make 
their information regularly available through country templates. Information from countries will be 
shared with the SUN global Networks and, if the Government Focal Point agrees, can be made publicly  
available through the SUN Movement website. The Secretariat analyses data received in the country 
templates and summarise it –at least annually –in a short document known as the ’Progress Summary 
Sheet’ (SUN 2012).  
 
The SUN constituent Networks are currently establishing goals and clarifying the processes through 
which they will facilitate support for national efforts. An annual assessment summarising the state of 
accountability across the Movement is included in the SUN progress report (Mannar 2012).  
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MAFSAN 
 
FAO’s Mapping Actions for Food Security and Nutrition (MAFSAN) is a web platform to help 
stakeholders at country, regional and global levels to share information about government investments 
in food and nutrition security. Although chiefly designed as a repository to collate an overview of policy 
and financial efforts, its relative ease of access also allows it to perform a basic accountability function.  
 
National Evaluation Platforms  
 
National Evaluation Platforms offer a systematic approach to collecting nutrition input, output and 
outcome data, which aims to assess the impact of nutrition interventions. Devised by Johns Hopkins 
University, this approach has been used in the area of health and efforts are underway to apply the 
concept to nutrition. Canada is currently supporting the roll-out of national evaluation platforms for 
maternal, newborn and child health in four countries. The platforms will include the collection of 
nutrition data. The European Commission is also currently consulting a range of stakeholders on how 
such Platforms and Nutrition Information Systems could be devised to support its monitoring of 
commitments made at the Nutrition for Growth Summit. 
 
OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting Mechanisms 
 
The OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting Mechanism currently is the most comprehensive data source on 
bilateral donor financing for food security, agriculture and nutrition. It records annual spending by a 
range of thematic codes. It is however not without fault. The breakdown of total donor aid for nutrition 
is notoriously difficult to make (Coppard and Zubairi 2011; Di Ciommo 2013; ACF International 2012a). 
Allocations of funds to thematic codes is not guaranteed to happen in a consistent manner by OECD 
members. Multilateral aid flows are not captured in a comprehensive manner that allows for making 
cross-country comparisons. As diverse donors have differential preferences for supporting food security 
and nutrition through bilateral and multilateral channels, it is currently not possible to compare 
countries for their total spending patterns without making some grand assumptions.  
 
Food Security Commitment and Capacity Profile 
 
FAO is currently developing a ‘balanced scorecard methodology’ to monitor countries’ commitment 
towards food and nutrition security, and their capacity to act on this. The scorecard is currently in the 
design phase, and will be the main instrument through which FAO seeks to deliver on its medium term 
strategic objective of enhancing political commitment to food and nutrition security across the globe.  
The scorecard is envisaged to inform dialogue between national authorities and development partners, 
and will be in the public domain with easy access to citizens and citizen groups (FAO 2013). 
 
Nutrition barometer 
 
The nutrition barometer (Save the Children/World Vision) offers a scorecard with nutrition input, output 
and outcome indicators for 36 developing countries, aiming to foster greater accountability for 
governments. 
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Social accountability mechanisms 
 
Further to the instruments and tools outlined above, internationally a growing range of social 
accountability tools are being used, at national and subnational government levels, and in some 
occasions already for enhancing nutrition outcomes. Some include Public Expenditure Tracking; 
Scorecards, and community audits, etc (Bjorkman and Svensson 2009). These tools are beyond the 
scope of this review.  
1.4.3  Indices 
 
The last few years has witnessed a steady proliferation of new metrics regarding hunger and nutrition, 
many taking the shape of an index. They all perform an accountability function, however their emphasis 
differs. Some focus on accountability for nutrition outcomes (e.g. Global Hunger Index, Hidden Hunger 
Index), others on outcomes and inputs (Global Food Security Index), whereas a third focus on 
accountability for government inputs and outputs (Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index). While 
most indices focus on developing countries, some also scrutinise donor countries (HANCI Donor Index) 
and major global food corporations (ATNI). 
 
Global Hunger Index 
 
The longest established index of its kind, the Global Hunger Index (GHI) is annually calculated (for 120 
countries in 2013), and focuses on hunger outcomes. The GHI combines three equally weighted 
indicators into one score: the proportion of people who are undernourished, the proportion of children 
under five who are underweight, and the mortality rate of children younger than age five (IFPRI 2012).  
 
Hidden Hunger Index 
 
The Hidden Hunger Index assesses chronic deficiency levels regarding essential vitamins and minerals 
(micronutrients) (Muthayya et al. 2013). This index shows 1) national prevalence data on stunting, 
anemia due to iron deficiency, and low serum retinol levels among preschool-aged children in 149 
countries; and 2) estimates of Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) attributed to micronutrient 
deficiencies in 136 countries. The tool and maps of global hidden hunger aim to help prioritise program 
assistance, and to serve as an evidence-based global advocacy tool. Like the GHI, it is outcome focused.  
 
Global Food Security Index 
 
The EIU’s Global Food Security Index compares 107 countries for 27 indicators on food availability, 
affordability, quality and safety. Several refer to nutrition inputs (e.g. existence of nutritional standards; 
nutrition plan or strategy) and outputs (e.g. aggregate micronutrient availability in a country) 
(http://foodsecurityindex.eiu.com/).  
 
Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI): Developing Countries  
 
Unlike previously listed indices, this Index uses input and output indicators to assess government action 
on hunger and undernutrition, rather than outcome indicators. HANCI annually measures political 
commitment to tackling hunger and undernutrition in 45 developing countries. It is the first global index 
 25 
 
of its kind showing countries’ relative levels of political commitment to tackle hunger and 
undernutrition in terms of appropriate policies, legal frameworks and public spending. The index further 
provides primary data on commitment levels, drawing on expert perception surveys and community 
focus groups. It aims to develop a commitment metric, to rank governments; to measure what they 
achieve and where they fail – providing greater transparency and public accountability; to praise 
governments where due, and highlight areas for improvement; and to support civil society to reinforce 
and stimulate additional commitment towards reducing hunger and undernutrition (te Lintelo, Haddad 
et al. 2013a). 
 
Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI): Donor Countries 
 
This index annually compares 23 donor countries for their performance on 14 indicators of political 
commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition in the developing world. It looks at two areas of 
donor inputs: Policies and Programmes and Public Expenditures (te Lintelo, Haddad and Lakshman 
2013b). 
 
ATNI: Access to Nutrition Index  
 
The Access to Nutrition Index (ATNI) attempts to inform citizens about policies, practices and 
performance of major global food and beverage manufacturers regarding obesity and undernutrition. 
By providing companies with a tool for benchmarking their nutrition practices and serving as an 
impartial source of information for interested stakeholders, ATNI aims to encourage companies to 
increase consumer access to nutritious products and responsibly exercise their influence on consumer 
choice and behaviour (Access to Nutrition Index website). 
 
ATNI seeks to stimulate dialogue about ways in which companies can improve their nutrition practices 
by serving as: 
 
 A means for companies to benchmark their approach to nutrition against their peers and 
identify areas for improvement; and 
 An independent source of information for stakeholders interested in monitoring and/or 
engaging with the food and beverage industry on nutrition issues (Source 
http://www.accesstonutrition.org/about-us). 
 
Healthy Food Environments Policy Index 
 
This index is currently under development, for publication in 2015/16 by the International Network for 
Food and Obesity/ NCD Research, Monitoring and Action Support (INFORMAS) (www.informas.org). 
INFORMAS is a global network of public-interest organisations and researchers that aims to monitor, 
benchmark and support public and private sector actions to create healthy food environments and 
reduce obesity, NCDs and their related inequalities. It seeks to develop a benchmarking tool to 
understand temporal and cross-country progress in government action on obesity, for monitoring and 
accountability purposes.  
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1.5 How well do nutrition accountability tools work?  
 
One way of answering this question is by investigating the strengths, constraints and missing aspects of 
existing accountability tools. Yet, information that can answer these questions is scarcely available in 
the public domain. A review approach as used in this paper thus provides only a partial perspective, 
presenting findings for a subset of the accountability mechanisms presented above. Many 
accountability tools are claimed to actively engage and consult with a variety of stakeholders. In some 
cases such as SUN, or the Country Assessment Frameworks under EWEC, new institutional 
arrangements to facilitate this have been set up. This offers potential for filling in the dialogic and 
explanatory function of accountability, and brings diverse perspectives and the voices of plural 
stakeholders into decision-making processes regarding appropriate interventions towards 
undernutrition reduction. The methodology applied for this paper however does not allow for a 
thorough assessment of the quality and inclusiveness of such deliberative processes. Moreover, it is 
particularly hard to build up an accurate picture of the implicit or explicit rules that govern stakeholders’ 
delivery of commitments; and the existence (leave be the application) of sanctions/rewards for 
(non)compliance, and their enforcement mechanisms. A key informant interviewing approach could be 
suitably employed to address these questions in more detail. However, arguably, where new nutrition 
commitments are made in future, an explicit and upfront demand for these aspects may help to clarify 
such rules and enforcement mechanisms, rather than depend on the post-summit working out of these. 
However, conceivably vagueness serves a political function in that it enables progress through an 
incremental logic of participation rather than a logic of compliance. 
 
Nutrition 4 Growth  
 
For a number of initiatives on nutrition it is too early to say how well accountability mechanisms work as 
they are still being designed. These include the N4G and EU commitments made under these. Several 
preliminary observations can however be made.  
 
The N4G accountability mechanism is being designed in consultation with UK civil society groups; 
accordingly, the dialogic function of accountability is already being performed.  
 
The N4G commitment monitoring is scheduled to be integrated with Scaling Up Nutrition efforts. As 
such, SUN business, civil society and other networks are now developing commitment tracking systems, 
however substantial uncertainty persists in tehse networks on how other networks go about doing so  
(pers. comm, February 2014, anonymised) suggesting there is a need for a larger degree of 
coordination. Other people involved in organisations that have made pledges such as the World Bank 
are lacking clarity on how and by whom N4G pledges will be monitored (pers. Comm. October 2013, 
anonymised). Without a central authority (for instance a lead group of representatives from parties that 
have made commitments) that drives forward the monitoring process of commitments, much depends 
on leadership and buy-in within individual networks and organisations, whose delivery of commitments 
is then likely to be done at different speeds.  
 
Observers (pers. comm, February 2014, anonymised) have also noted that many N4G commitments are 
open to interpretation and are not measurable and time bound. For instance, uncertainty exists on 
which kinds of donor funds can and cannot be used towards fulfilling commitments, avoiding double 
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counting between actors. Moreover, discussions are ongoing if monitoring mechanisms should and 
could take account not just of inputs, but also of impacts on beneficiaries.  
 
In the absence of greater coordination, several organisations have started to self-report on the 
commitments they have made at the N4G summit. InterAction has developed a model for sharing 
spending data with the U.S. government and others around the UN General Assembly. It uses a 
reporting framework similar to the G8’s L’Aquila pledge, identifying spending by its members in all the 
countries they operate in, for the following categories: 
 
 Nutrition. 
 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, animal husbandry. 
 Food aid/food security assistance. 
 
It uses 2012 data as a baseline (nutrition spending = $62 million out of a portfolio of $452 million) 
against which spending over the pledge period of 2013-2015 will be compared. Its first report is due 
September 2014.  
 
InterAction offers just one example of a broader trend. As private sector and civil society actors are 
increasingly becoming integral partners to international nutrition commitment initiatives, currently a 
fair amount of fragmented experimentation is taking place on how these actors are embedded in 
monitoring mechanisms for these initiatives. Much learning remains to be done on what works and 
what not. Questions to consider in this respect include what kind of monitoring data can these actors be 
realistically expected to provide? What resources are needed for them to successfully do so? And what 
kind of supporting structures can facilitate and streamline their contributions?  
 
Every Woman Every Child (EWEC) 
 
The EWEC accountability framework is exceptionally well-funded13 and has some important 
institutional features. An independent Expert Review Group (iERG) has been empowered to exercise an 
accountability function regarding the UN Secretary-General’s Global Strategy for Women’s and 
Children’s Health (GMMB 2013). iERG members are in a good position to provide independent and 
critical comment, as they sit outside those institutions and governments that implement the Global 
Strategy. Furthermore, prior to being nominated, iERG members are subjected to a conflict of interest 
assessment by WHO. 
 
Furthermore, the work of the iERG is guided by a monitoring framework with 18 indicators, which itself 
was devised by the Commission on Information and Accountability for Women’s and Children’s Health, 
chaired by the Prime Minister of Canada and President of Tanzania. iERG uses a country led approach to 
monitoring, and uses consultations to assess evidence provided by a range of stakeholders. Finally, in 
addition to providing updates on progress, the iERG is also empowered to make recommendations that 
go beyond a strict ’on-track/off-track’ report, steering discussions on how to accelerate progress and 
also adapt to changing circumstances. Whether these recommendations are binding requires further 
investigation, as are any sticks or carrots that the iERG can use to incentivise greater compliance with 
commitments made. Its Terms of Reference (iERG, 2012) are not clear about this.   
                                               
13 To the cost of $5.6 million for 2012-2015. 
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Several civil society organisations that made commitments towards the Global Strategy have now 
commenced reporting on these for accountability purposes. For instance, World Vision International 
(WVI) announced its EWEC Commitment of US$1.5 billon ($500 million through grants and foundations) 
in support of women’s and children’s health on 20th September 2010. In 2012, WVI commissioned a 
review of progress with regard to its commitment with a focus on: validation of the strategic alignment 
of programming practice with its EWEC Commitment; and an assessment of actual total expenditures 
made which may be counted towards its EWEC Commitment (e.g. maternal, newborn and child health 
programmes). The overall assessment concluded that World Vision is firmly on track to meet its full 
commitment (Crowe, Clarke and Whitehill 2013).  
 
Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN)  
 
The SUN Movement has emerged as a potentially powerful platform to bring governments and other 
entities together to drive action to improve nutrition at the national and global levels. Whereas it has 
established a unique forum for sharing and learning, the Movement must now use emerging evidence to 
strengthen the resolve of the broader community and show the impact that this coordinated effort can 
have (Mannar 2012). SUN has devised a clear accountability framework with targets. Countries working 
to scale up nutrition are adopting national goals that collectively aim to meet the WHA targets by 2025. 
The Movement aims to focus on tailoring an approach to ensure nutritional improvements that align 
with national needs and opportunities, but is not mandated to apply a uniform approach and lacks a 
strong ‘stick’ to enforce commitments of members; it is not clear how this affects its ability to track 
progress.  
 
Domestically, SUN Civil Society Platforms are designed to play an important role in energising civil 
society and assist them in holding governments to account. These Civil Society Networks are made up 
of national and international organisations working in various areas including: farmers, fisherfolk, 
human rights defenders, women’s groups, humanitarian and aid assistance agencies, research entities, 
consumer groups, trade unions and many others. The primary purpose of the Civil Society Network is to 
align the strategies, efforts and resources of civil society with country plans for scaling up nutrition 
within the SUN Framework. Organisations within the Civil Society Network work together to build 
capacity and maximise resources to ensure the greatest impact on nutrition 
(http://scalingupnutrition.org/the-sun-network/civil-society-network). Yet, some critics of the SUN 
Movement assert that it uses a ‘top-down’ approach privileging leaders and experts, and insufficiently 
involves local communities. Technical interventions are favoured over social, economic and political 
actions (Right to Food and Watch 2011).  
 
Whereas SUN publishes a substantial amount of data on its website, some civil society organisations 
consider that a lack of transparent information on nutrition spending, progress and planning is a key 
binding constraint for effective engagement and accountability at both the international and national 
levels. To monitor progress, the SUN Movement must clarify where nutrition funds are coming from. 
Governments, bi-laterals, foundations and other donors all track nutrition investments different—with 
direct-nutrition investments easier to trace in comparison with nutrition-sensitive investments, which 
can be integrated across programs and ministries. The SUN Donor Network has taken on the challenge 
of 1) improving the tracking of investments (Mannar 2012: p.7); 2) calculating and disclosing their 
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contribution to progress against key nutritional outcomes; and 3) developing and publishing their own 
nutrition strategies (ONE Campaign 2013a). 
 
Another challenge for the Movement is the challenge to monitor mutual accountability. To foster this 
responsibility, stakeholders must make the Movement their own by being invested in not only the 
programs and efforts on the ground, but invested also in the success of the full Movement. Thus, 
Mannar argues that collectively, the SUN Movement should define what it is to be a supporter of the 
Movement and what is expected from those that endorse this approach. Stakeholders should be held 
accountable for an organisation-wide commitment to nutrition—working to integrate nutrition 
internally to mirror the coordination that the Movement seeks to achieve at the country-level (Mannar 
2012:8). Essentially, Mannar argues that the rules of engagement and internal norms of performance in 
the SUN Movement members are to be clarified. This is an important step towards enhancing 
accountability, however the SUN Movement would also need a clear enforcement mechanisms that 
rewards members’ good performance and deters underperformance.  
 
L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI)  
 
The pledges of 22 billion dollar funding made at the 2009 L’Aquila Food Security Initiative was 
characterised by opaque monitoring mechanisms, and difficulties determining the extent to which new 
monies were disbursed (ONE 2010). Experiences with the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI) 
demonstrated that common frameworks for setting out and reporting on commitments are critical for 
achieving greater accountability. Arguably, the basic structures of any such frameworks need to be 
integral to and publicly presented at the time of announcing commitments. 
 
In the case of AFSI, donors agreed to neither a uniform timeframe for delivering their pledges nor a 
uniform system for measuring progress. Thus, while most donors agreed to report their financial 
progress in disbursements, the US, Germany and Japan specified that their pledges would be measured 
in budgetary appropriations or commitments (ONE Campaign 2013b: 88 and 92). Furthermore, when 
donors made their pledges, they varied the form of their pledges: Canada, France, Italy and the UK 
pledged disbursements; while Germany, the EU institutions and Japan pledged in commitments; and the 
US in appropriations (Congressional budget allocations). They did this to account for variations in 
political, bureaucratic and budgetary differences; however the differences in pledge forms, periods and 
reporting made it difficult for the G8 to be held accountable for their commitments. Future pledges 
should be made with accountability mechanisms in mind, and include comparable pledging and 
reporting formats (ONE Campaign 2013b). 
 
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 
 
The New Alliance initiative was received with scepticism by the NGO community, which had concerns 
about transparency and accountability measures to ensure companies are prioritising the needs of 
targeted beneficiaries (e.g. smallholders, non-farm workers), and a lack of input from local civil society 
leaders (ONE Campaign 2012). Priority outcomes for New Alliance private sector investments are 
narrowly focused on increasing agricultural crop yields through improved technology; a more 
sustainable and inclusive agenda would need to prioritise nutrition, gender equity, environmental 
sustainability, and climate response. Neither increased yields nor increased incomes are sufficient to 
improve the nutritional status of populations, and the G8 and the New Alliance were called on to 
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prioritise improved nutritional outcomes and produce a clear overall target and timelines to achieving 
them (InterAction 2012).  
 
The role of the private sector in enhancing/weakening nutrition outcomes is important, however current 
accountability mechanisms for delivering nutritious food products tailored to the needs of vulnerable 
populations, whether through markets or public regulation, are underdeveloped. As private sector 
actors are at the heart of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, civil society groups such as 
Interaction (2012) have argued that they are expected to be held accountable for performance targets 
beyond mere production, to include improved capacity of smallholder farmers – especially women – to 
contribute to food security and nutrition, reduce poverty, and achieve positive environmental goals 
(Interaction 2012). The opaque nature and limited information on the New Alliance has driven 
misconceptions about the content of the Letters of Intent provided by the 80 companies pledging 
investments in African agriculture to the tune of $5 billion, and which firms are driving the investment 
agenda (ONE Campaign 2012). More recently, the New Alliance has been called a Trojan horse, as it has 
driven revisions in agricultural land ownership laws in several countries that are beneficial for businesses 
but detrimental to local farming communities (the Guardian, 2014). Civil society groups have proposed 
several measures to be taken to enhance accountability (InterAction 2012; ONE Campaign 2012): 
 
 Private sector firms need to make public their Letters of Intent.  
 Investment figures should be complete and regularly updated.  
 Investment projects need a common set of indicators to assess their contribution to the 
New Alliance goals. 
 Create annual progress reports to demonstrate long-term commitment. Progress is to be 
assessed against the G-8 commitment of lifting 50 million people out of poverty over the 
next ten years.  
 Annual reports that summarise the impact of each company’s commitment need to be 
publically available, for review by participating governments and civil society.  
 Civil society must be represented on the New Alliance Leadership Council at the global level 
and in each consultation group and structure at the country level. 
 New Alliance private sector partners, like donors, must be transparent about current and 
committed levels of funding and be guided by the Rome principles, including support for 
country-led plans. Currently, New Alliance country frameworks do not impose this 
requirement on private sector parties, beyond meeting financial commitments.  
 
Responding to these critiques, the September 2013 Leadership Council meeting for the New Alliance for 
Food Security and Nutrition endorsed a draft Accountability Framework that sets out how New Alliance 
partners will measure and report results to the African Union, the G8, civil society and other external 
stakeholders. Recognizing the importance to build on and feed into existing national plans and 
frameworks such as the CAADP Results Framework and the CAADP review processes and reporting 
mechanisms, the proposed accountability process for the New Alliance will also be integrated at the 
country-level and include a single private sector reporting process. 
 
Generic accountability tools 
 
Finally, for most of the generic nutrition accountability tools, that is, those that are not tied to specific 
commitments and pledges (e.g. WHO Nutrition Landscape Analysis and including a set of indices), it is 
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often not clear whether these provide more than simply another source of information. Thus, while such 
data is premised to enable greater scrutiny of government inputs, outputs and nutrition outcomes, the 
extent to which such data is used by stakeholders to hold governments (or private sector companies) to 
account is not known. Whereas it is reasonable to assume that this data is accessible for policy 
advocacy, it could be worth assessing the extent, purposes for which it is used, how credible their 
findings are for policymakers, and their impacts on driving policy change promoting better nutrition. As 
indices on hunger and nutrition proliferate, there is a greater need for understanding their impact on 
policy and policy discourse. The Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index is accordingly now being 
assessed for its use, and its added value for civil society groups for advocacy purposes and for 
influencing public policy and key stakeholders.  
1.6 Missing entry points for accountability agents 
 
This section identifies a number of gaps, which filling would contribute to better performing 
accountability mechanisms. We identify which are needed to be addressed in the long, medium and 
short term, and which are critical to be addressed for delivering on international nutrition 
commitments. We start with recommendations regarding the architecture of accountability for 
international nutrition commitments, and then discuss specific aspects of nutrition data at national and 
subnational levels that need improving to become an important evidence base that allows assessment 
of progress on international nutrition commitments.  
 
The architecture of accountability mechanisms for international nutrition commitments 
 
 Most accountability mechanisms for international nutrition commitments engage with aspects 
of evidence, dialogue and (less pronouncedly) monitoring. Harder to establish aspects of  
accountability, such as rules of engagement and rules of membership, combined with clear 
enforcement mechanisms that incentivise good and disincentivise bad behaviour appear to be 
an afterthought. Thus, even the most advanced international initiatives that seek to help deliver 
nutrition commitments, such as the SUN Movement and EWEC, have as yet only weakly 
developed (and publicised) enforcement mechanisms. Consequently, the enforceability of 
international nutrition commitments should not be assumed as a given.  
 
 The review found it particularly hard to build up an accurate picture of the implicit or explicit 
rules that govern stakeholders’ delivery of commitments made in international fora and 
summits; the existence (leave be the application) of sanctions/rewards for (non)compliance; and 
the existence and effectiveness of possible mechanisms that enforce these. Where these rules 
and enforcement mechanisms exist, more transparency about their nature would leverage 
greater accountability for nutrition commitments. Where they do not exist, accountability 
mechanisms will remain weak, and the enforceability of commitments subject to substantial 
uncertainty. Further primary research may be commissioned to explore the political economy 
factors that make it so hard to develop and agree on rules of engagement and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
 
 Perhaps one reason why the MDGs were relatively successful in mobilising both international 
and domestic political support for a diverse group of development standards was that its time 
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horizon of 15 years offered a more realistic timeframe within which accountable institutional 
mechanisms could be developed. In contrast, most nutrition commitments have a much shorter 
time horizon; typically less than 5 years (e.g. AFSI, N4G, but not the WHA targets), tied to 
domestic electoral cycles of international political leaders that initiate these commitments. 
However, short time horizons sit uneasily with the development of accountability systems that 
depend on incremental approaches and logics of participation rather than logics of compliance.  
 
 The role of the private sector as actors in international nutrition commitment initiatives is 
important, and so is their role as market actors that could enhance/weaken nutrition outcomes.  
However current accountability mechanisms for delivering nutritious food products tailored to 
the needs of vulnerable populations, whether through markets or public regulation, are 
underdeveloped. It will be important to engage with the private sector and the food industry to 
assist in developing improved products, market mechanisms, and streamlined delivery channels 
(Fanzo and Pronyk 2010). 
 
 Whereas substantial yet highly diverse accountability structures have emanated from diverse 
initiatives (N4G; SUN; EWEC, etc.), for parties that have to hold others to account, it is not 
always clear what these commitments look like in their entirety due to their fragmentation 
across initiatives. A central register on nutrition commitments may be established in the short 
run to provide and maintain an up to date, and complete overview of commitments by different 
public, private and third sector actors. Such a register would also have to show which 
commitments are new and additional, and which are not.  
 
 There is a substantial amount of experimentation concerning self-reporting mechanisms for 
nutrition commitments. Self-reporting mechanisms are an example of the incremental 
approach and a response to a lack of centralised authority in charge of monitoring and enforcing 
international nutrition commitments. Whereas self-reporting mechanisms could make a 
valuable contribution to enhanced accountability, in the absence of strong coordination and 
common rules on how to report on delivery of commitments, there is a real risk of this leading to 
a cacophony of approaches that are difficult to compare, assess, and add up.  
 
 Common frameworks for setting out and reporting on financial and other kinds of commitments 
are critical for achieving greater accountability for nutrition commitments. Existing nutrition 
commitment initiatives should as a priority develop such frameworks, identify indicators that 
are SMART and drawing on international best practice and paying sufficient attention to the 
diverse needs of public, private and third sector actors that sign up to these. Reviews of such 
best practice may be commissioned to identify a series of principles and approaches that may 
be applied to nutrition commitments and to make the most of current disjointed learning in this 
respect by various actors.  
 
 For future international nutrition commitment initiatives, common frameworks for setting out 
and reporting on commitments need to be integral to and publicly presented at the time of 
announcing commitments. This will be particularly pertinent for those initiatives that have a 
relatively short time horizon (less than 5 years).  
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Nutrition output and outcome data gaps 
 
The current key challenges with nutrition data are as follows: 
 
 More than a substantial number of African countries lack nutrition status data, and many more 
countries lack reliable nutrition output data on the coverage and quality of programs. Where 
data on status outcomes is produced through nationally representative sample surveys, it is 
often done so infrequently, less than every three to five years. Where data is produced more 
frequently through routine monitoring, it is of varying quality and often unstandardised. Recent 
warnings have been sounded about the validity of data presented by African statistical offices 
(Jerven 2013). This is especially problematic in settings which are affected by frequent 
emergencies (UN 2012) and in high risk settings (Fanzo and Pronyk 2010), impeding greater 
accountability (Nutrition for Growth 2013: 4-5). To address this, FAO with Gallup World Poll is 
currently developing a new FAO-certified standard for food security monitoring that may be 
easily adopted by other household surveys (UN 2012). Clearly, basic data on nutrition statuses is 
critical for informing policy action, and further investments are needed now to ensure that in 
the medium term affordable and reliable nutrition monitoring instruments can be employed by 
all countries.   
 
 MDG1 indicators on children under five years of age who are underweight and the proportion of 
the population who are undernourished are not the best indicators to assess hunger, food 
security and the health of a population. Countries may benefit from simplifying and 
streamlining alternative core nutrition measures, such as mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) 
for acute malnutrition. Stunting, the height for age of children under five years of age, provides 
a better indicator to assess the long -term impacts of hunger, poor nutrition and poverty (Fanzo 
and Pronyk 2010; Haddad and Corbett 2013; Mannar 2012). These, and commitment to hunger 
and undernutrition reduction should be indicators to be assessed as a potential post-2015 
development goal (te Lintelo, Haddad et al. 2013a).  
 
 The potential for expanded support and integration of nutrition into goals across health and 
development offers an opportunity to address the underlying causes of malnutrition, to position 
nutrition as necessary and central to the success of broader efforts (Mannar 2012: 6). In the 
medium term, monitoring the extent to which integration is done, and how to do it, could be of 
strategic importance, given that currently no such data exists.  
 
 Equity in nutrition: while (horizontal) iniquitous distributional outcomes between social groups 
(differentiated by gender, ethnicity, race, class, etc) or between geographic areas are common 
in many countries, data on these are rarely routinely collected and made available, either due to 
a failure to design for this, or due to data aggregation practices that obscure these. 
Consequently, tracking whether nutrition interventions reach the populations most in need; 
their cost-effectiveness, and the distributional effects of such interventions is severely impeded. 
In the medium and long term, socially progressive and more accountable policy interventions 
require better nutrition data, disaggregated for equity. 
 
 Real time nutrition data collection using mobile technology is gaining traction as an idea, as it 
offers potential for easier and quicker access to data that can demonstrate what works and 
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what not at community, district and country levels. However, while work on developing 
appropriate real time nutrition monitoring methodologies is ongoing, these have not been fully 
developed as yet, and their practical feasibility remains to be demonstrated (Barnett et al. 
2013). Assessments of the cost-effectiveness of real time monitoring instruments for nutrition 
could be a sensible short run investment strategy.  
 
 The High-Level Panel Report on the Post-2015 Development Agenda also emphasizes the 
importance of addressing data gaps and enhancing donor accountability for the post-2015 
agenda, suggesting initiatives to improve the quality and quantity of public statistics. This 
indicates an increasing global recognition of the importance of data collection for monitoring 
results and keeping donors accountable, which could be leveraged to improve global nutrition 
monitoring tools. 
 
Capacity to deliver nutrition programmes  
 
 Globally and at national level, data on nutrition delivery capacity (through public, NGO, or 
private delivery mechanisms; the existence of training facilities at degree and vocational levels; 
the availability of qualified trained staff etc.) is weak, often outdated and not collected in a 
systematic manner enabling international comparisons. Whatever capacity data exists is 
aggregated at national level. At subnational level, administrative capacity to collect and 
maintain nutrition data systems is often severely constrained, even though subnational units 
(such as districts, woredas, etc.) are critical loci of policy and programme implementation. 
Consequently, efforts to enhance delivery capacity in areas that most need it are impeded. 
Strengthening data generation and maintenance systems on capacity are therefore a matter of 
urgency (Fanzo and Pronyk 2010). Operationalised at subnational levels, these have real 
potential to enhance accountability relations between governments to local citizens, especially 
where this involves greater transparency of and access to disaggregated data. While some 
efforts are now undertaken to collate country capacity profiles, notably the WHO Nutrition 
Landscape Information System, these have to resort to crude proxy indicators such as GDP per 
capita. FAO is currently developing a primary research based assessment of capacity using 
expert perceptions in its member countries. This has the potential to become an important data 
source, however, should not detract governments from collecting their own routine data on 
capacity indicators. 
 
 Nutrition tends to be part of the mandate of health systems, although efforts are spreading to 
use sector wide approaches for nutrition. Health systems are in need of strengthened 
information systems enabling better M&E; premised on greater capacity to effectively 
generate, manage, disseminate and utilise health information at all levels of the sector for 
programme management and development. Such information includes measures with 
immediate relevance to nutrition, such as effective vital statistics and birth registration systems 
(http://www.who.int/woman_child_accountability/en/). Integral to developing these 
information systems will have to be efforts to train nutrition staff to design and effectively use 
monitoring and information systems (pers. Comm. October 2013 anonymous). Moreover, in the 
medium run, where nutrition trained staff are increasingly employed in a wider range of sectoral 
agencies (agriculture, health, social protection, etc.), coterminous development of the receiving 
agency’s capacity of to effectively integrate and use these human resources will be required.  
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Financial inputs and donor accountability 
 
 In the short run, there is a priority need to establish nutrition funding requirements at the 
national level. To move from the broad cost assessments (Horton, Shekar et al. 2010) to identify 
country-specific needs, countries need to estimate costs associated with implementation of 
national nutrition plans, strategies and programming, and to assess funding gaps. SUN 
Networks are currently undertaking such an effort, in order to facilitate donor alignment of 
efforts to support full implementation (Mannar 2012). 
 
 Most low income countries still do not have a budget line that calculates nutrition spending 
(ONE Campaign 2013a). In the short run, establishing nutrition budgets would be a first step 
towards enhanced capacity to monitor public expenditure data on nutrition, which currently is 
either not routinely collected in a standardised manner or missing in many developing 
countries. It would be desirable from an accountability and social contract perspective to know 
what shares of public expenditures on nutrition in developing countries are funded by domestic 
sources versus donor sources. International efforts to regular map these spending flows, for 
instance in a Global Nutrition Report, could incentivise countries to give this greater attention.  
 
 Attributing impacts in terms of improved nutrition outcomes for different types of nutrition 
investment, whether public or private, constitutes a serious challenge. For example, very little is 
known about the impact of business investments in nutrition, or of nutrition sensitive 
investments in agriculture, social protection etc. Financial spending indicators would make 
more meaningful indicators for accountability once their relation to impact is clearer.  
 
 Multilateral agencies such as WHO (Chopra, Pelletier et al. 2009; Engesveen, Nishida et al. 
2009), FAO (pers comm.), UNICEF, the SUN Secretariat (SUN 2010; 2011; ACF 2012; Mannar 
2012; SUN 2012b; 2012c) and others (REACH 2012) have commenced monitoring commitments 
of aid recipient countries to address hunger and undernutrition. 
 
 How can the performance of donor countries towards addressing hunger and undernutrition be 
made more accountable? Literature on this topic is thin but expanding (ONE 2010; Coppard and 
Zubairi 2011; ACF International 2012b; 2012a; Di Ciommo 2013; ONE 2013). This critical gaze has 
however not yet been sufficiently extended to bilateral and multilateral donors and 
philanthropic foundations (te Lintelo, Haddad et al. 2013b). OECD bilateral aid categorises 
nutrition spending, but suffers from substantial inaccuracies (Coppard and Zubairi 2011; Di 
Ciommo 2013). ‘The CRS database is problematic to use for detailed tracking of ODA to the 
nutrition sector due to poor donor reporting practices and limitations with the CRS database 
itself’ (ACF International 2012a, executive summary) and thus do not allow a proper monitoring 
of spending on food and nutrition’ (ACF International 2012b: 41). Greater international 
collaborative action is needed to devise new methodologies to more accurately map these aid 
spending flows. This will need to be done simultaneously with improving monitoring 
mechanisms at national level, to demonstrate that accountability for financial flows is equally 
the business of aid donor as well as aid recipients.  
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